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Knowledge of the severity of an influenza outbreak is crucial for
informing and monitoring appropriate public health responses, both
during and after an epidemic. However, case-fatality, case-intensive
care admission and case-hospitalisation risks are difficult to mea-
sure directly. Bayesian evidence synthesis methods have previously
been employed to combine fragmented, under-ascertained and bi-
ased surveillance data coherently and consistently, to estimate case-
severity risks in the first two waves of the 2009 A/H1N1 influenza
pandemic experienced in England. We present in detail the complex
probabilistic model underlying this evidence synthesis, and extend
the analysis to also estimate severity in the third wave of the pan-
demic strain during the 2010/2011 influenza season. We adapt the
model to account for changes in the surveillance data available over
the three waves. We consider two approaches: (a) a two-stage ap-
proach using posterior distributions from the model for the first two
waves to inform priors for the third wave model; and (b) a one-stage
approach modelling all three waves simultaneously. Both approaches
result in the same key conclusions: (1) that the age-distribution of
the case-severity risks is “u”-shaped, with children and older adults
having the highest severity; (2) that the age-distribution of the infec-
tion attack rate changes over waves, school-age children being most
affected in the first two waves and the attack rate in adults over 25
increasing from the second to third waves; and (3) that when aver-
aged over all age groups, case-severity appears to increase over the
three waves. The extent to which the final conclusion is driven by
the change in age-distribution of those infected over time is subject
to discussion.
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1. Introduction. Evidence synthesis [e.g., Spiegelhalter, Abrams and
Myles (2004), Ades and Sutton (2006)] has become an important method in
epidemiology, where multiple, disparate, incomplete and often biased sources
of observational (e.g., surveillance or survey) data are available to inform
estimation of relevant quantities, such as prevalence and incidence of infec-
tious disease [Welton and Ades (2005), Goubar et al. (2008), Sweeting et al.
(2008), Albert et al. (2011), Presanis et al. (2011a), Birrell et al. (2011)].
Data may directly inform a quantity of interest, θ, or, more usually, may in-
directly inform multiple parameters Θ by directly informing some function
of Θ, ψ = ψ(Θ). Such a function may represent, for example, the relation-
ship between a biased source of data and the parameter the data should
theoretically measure, so that the bias is explicitly modelled. Evidence syn-
thesis methods combine these heterogeneous types of challenging data in a
coherent manner, to estimate the “basic” parameters Θ and from these ob-
tain simultaneously the “functional” parameters Ψ= {ψ1(Θ), . . . , ψm(Θ)}.
These functional parameters include both those directly observed and oth-
ers that may not be observed but are of interest to estimate. This type of
estimation typically necessitates the formulation of complex probabilistic
models, often in a Bayesian framework.
Knowledge of the severity of an influenza outbreak is crucial for informing
and monitoring appropriate public health responses. Severity estimates are
necessary not only during a pandemic to inform immediate public health
responses, but also afterwards, when a robust reconstruction of what hap-
pened during the pandemic is required to evaluate the responses. Moreover,
as has happened in past influenza pandemics [Miller et al. (2009)], if a pan-
demic strain continues to circulate for some years, with unusual patterns of
age-specific mortality, then severity estimates over time, both in terms of
attack rates (the proportion of the population infected) and case-severity
risks (the probability an infection leads to a severe event), are required to
understand if the strain is likely to continue circulating and if severity is
changing over time.
However, severity is an example epidemic characteristic that is difficult to
measure directly. Typically, severity is expressed as the probability that an
infection will result in a severe event, for example, death. We refer to this
probability as the “case-fatality risk” (CFR). Severity may also be quantified
by “case-hospitalisation” (CHR) and “case-intensive care admission” (CIR)
risks, defined similarly as probabilities that an infection results in hospitali-
sation or intensive care (ICU) admission. Not all influenza infections will be
symptomatic, where “symptomatic” may be defined in different ways, but is
here taken to denote febrile influenza-like illness (ILI). Not all infections will
therefore result in symptoms severe enough for a patient to access health
care and hence be detectable in surveillance systems [Reed et al. (2009),
Presanis et al. (2011b), Birrell et al. (2011)]. Symptomatic case-severity
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risks (sCHR, sCIR, sCFR), the probabilities a symptomatic infection leads
to severe events, are therefore also considered as important indicators of
severity for influenza. Estimation of these probabilities requires information
on both the cumulative incidence of (symptomatic) infection over a period
of time of interest (the denominator) and the cumulative incidence of severe
events (the numerator). However, the denominator, whether symptomatic or
all infection, is challenging to determine, due to the unobserved infections.
Population-wide serological testing (testing for antibodies to influenza infec-
tion in blood serum samples) to measure the proportion of the population
infected is one possibility, but is unlikely to be feasible. This challenge is
only compounded in a pandemic situation, where resources and time are
even more stretched than usual [e.g., Lipsitch et al. (2009), Garske et al.
(2009)].
The most feasible approach to the assessment of severity is therefore via
estimation, combining data from different sources and accounting for their
biases, due, for example, to under-ascertainment. The majority of methods
adopted to estimate influenza case-severity [e.g., Reed et al. (2009), Garske
et al. (2009), Wilson and Baker (2009), Pebody et al. (2010), Wielders et al.
(2012), Sypsa et al. (2011)] have not systematically accounted for all biases.
Crucially, they have not made use of all available information in the esti-
mation process, nor have they accounted for all uncertainty inherent in the
data. Bayesian evidence synthesis provides a flexible framework in which
all available relevant data may be coherently amalgamated, together with
prior information on biases, to estimate case-severity [Lipsitch et al. (2011),
McDonald et al. (2014), Presanis et al. (2009, 2011b), Shubin et al. (2013),
Wu et al. (2010)].
Until the 2012/2013 winter, England experienced three waves of infec-
tion with the 2009 pandemic A/H1N1 influenza strain: in the summer of
2009, the autumn and winter of 2009–2010, and the autumn and winter
of 2010–2011. The severity of the first two waves, as measured by case-
severity risks, was previously estimated [Presanis et al. (2011b)] by syn-
thesising data either from surveillance systems in place to monitor sea-
sonal influenza or from systems set up specifically in response to the pan-
demic [Health Protection Agency (2010)]. In this paper, we present in detail
the statistical model used in Presanis et al. (2011b) and extend the ap-
proach to estimating severity in the third wave of infection. After the first
two waves, the World Health Organization declared a move to a post-
pandemic period (http://www.who.int/mediacentre/news/statements/
2010/h1n1_vpc_20100810/en/index.html), at which time many of the
surveillance systems that operated during the pandemic situation were either
stopped or changed in form. We describe how the model of Presanis et al.
(2011b) is further developed to account for these changes in the available
data.
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The evidence used to estimate severity in the first two waves and the
changes to the surveillance systems between waves are described in Section 2.
A Bayesian approach to evidence synthesis is introduced in Section 3. We
then describe in Section 4 a generic model for estimating severity, before
showing in Section 5.1 how the model was implemented in the first two
waves. We next develop the model to estimate severity in the third wave,
presenting two approaches (Sections 5.2 and 5.3, resp.). Results are given in
Section 6 and we end with a discussion in Section 7.
2. Surveillance data.
2.1. First & second waves. During the first two pandemic waves in 2009–
2010, data were available from various surveillance systems at or used by
the UK’s Health Protection Agency (HPA, now Public Health England)
that provided evidence on some aspect of the pandemic, at various levels
of severity. These sources indirectly informed the case-severity risks and
full details of each are given in Section 1.1 of the supplementary material
[Presanis et al. (2014)]. Briefly, they included the following:
(i) data on laboratory-confirmed pandemic A/H1N1 cases [i.e., cases
where infection with the pandemic strain was confirmed virologically, via
real-time polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR) testing of nasal or throat
swabs] in the first few weeks of the pandemic [Health Protection Agency,
Health Protection Scotland, Communicable Disease Surveillance Centre
Northern Ireland and National Public Health Service for Wales (2009),
Health Protection Agency (2010)]. The data included dates of illness on-
set and information on hospital admission if it occurred, from which age
group-specific case-hospitalisation risks amongst confirmed cases could be
estimated. Note that these confirmed-case-hospitalisation risks are likely to
be higher than the case-hospitalisation risks in all symptomatic cases, since
not all symptomatic cases will have been confirmed in the first few weeks,
and more severe cases in hospital are more likely to have been detected than
less severe cases;
(ii) estimates of the number of symptomatic cases by week, age and
region, produced by the HPA. These estimates were recognised to be under-
estimates, given the data of point (iii);
(iii) serial data on age group-specific proportions of individuals with anti-
bodies to the pandemic strain of influenza (“sero-prevalence”), from repeated
cross-sectional surveys of residual sera from other (unrelated) diagnostic
testing [Miller et al. (2010), Hardelid et al. (2011)]. These data indirectly
inform the cumulative incidence of infection, that is, the proportion of the
population infected over a period of time. Initially these data were taken
at face value, but concerns about potential sampling biases led to extra
sensitivity analyses (see Section 6.1);
SYNTHESISING EVIDENCE TO ESTIMATE INFLUENZA SEVERITY 5
(iv) data on laboratory-confirmed cases in hospital [Campbell et al.
(2011)], including age group and dates of illness onset, hospital admission
and ICU admission; and
(v) data on the number of deaths amongst persons with confirmed pan-
demic A/H1N1 influenza and/or mention of influenza on the death certifi-
cate, reported to the HPA and/or the Chief Medical Officer [Donaldson et al.
(2009), Pebody et al. (2010)].
2.2. Third wave. During the third wave, data sources (i), (ii) and (iv)
were no longer available in the same form. Although results from testing
of samples from before and after the third wave from data source (iii) are
now available [Hoschler et al. (2012)], at the time of the analyses presented
here, they were not accessible. Full details of each source below are given in
Section 1.2 of the supplementary material [Presanis et al. (2014)].
(vi) Between the second and third waves, the surveillance system for
hospital admissions of confirmed cases moved to being a sentinel surveillance
system, the UK Severe Influenza Surveillance Scheme (USISS). The data
from this system are available at a coarser level of age aggregation and come
from a sentinel sample of 23 acute NHS hospital trusts in the 2010–2011
season, as opposed to the 129 trusts participating in hospital surveillance
during the first two waves.
(vii) Additional data are available on patients present in all ICUs in Eng-
land with suspected pandemic A/H1N1 influenza, again at a coarser age
aggregation, from the Department of Health [DH; Department of Health
(2011)].
(viii) We also have data on virological positivity (proportion testing posi-
tive for the pandemic strain) from a sentinel system, “Datamart,” comprising
results of RT-PCR testing from 16 HPA and NHS laboratories in England,
covering mainly patients hospitalised with respiratory illness.
(ix) In the third wave, the HPA estimates of source (ii) were not avail-
able, due to the underlying data being specified at a different level of disag-
gregation. Instead, we use estimates of the number symptomatic (details in
Section 3.1 of the supplementary material [Presanis et al. (2014)]) obtained
from an alternative general practice sentinel surveillance system [Fleming
(1999)].
2.3. Challenges. Estimating case-severity by dividing the observed num-
ber of infections at a severe level over a period of time by the observed (i.e.,
confirmed) number of infections in the same period is highly likely to re-
sult in biased estimates. This bias is due to both under-ascertainment of
infections in surveillance systems and differential probabilities of observa-
tion by severity of infection [Garske et al. (2009), Presanis et al. (2011b)].
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Any estimation therefore has to account for these probabilities of observing
infections (“detection probabilities”). Further challenges are posed by the
following: uncertainty about the representativeness of the surveillance data
for the general population (sampling biases); the different degrees of aggre-
gation in each data source; the fact that some of the data sources, such as the
sero-prevalence data, only inform indirectly the number of infections; and
the changes in surveillance systems over time. A synthesis of all the above
data sources to estimate case-severity therefore requires these challenges to
be addressed.
3. Evidence synthesis methods. Evidence synthesis [see, e.g., Eddy, Has-
selblad and Shachter (1992), Ades and Sutton (2006)] denotes the idea of
estimating a set of k “basic” parameters Θ= (θ1, θ2, . . . , θk) from a collec-
tion of n independent data sources y= (y1, y2, . . . , yn), arising from multiple
studies, perhaps of differing design. Each source yi, i ∈ 1, . . . , n provides ev-
idence on a “functional” parameter ψi = fi(Θ). The function fi may either
be equality to a single specific element θj of Θ, so that the data directly
informs θj , or a function of one or more components of Θ, so that the data
indirectly inform multiple basic parameters. The collection (ψ1, ψ2, . . . , ψn)
is therefore a mixture of basic and functional parameters. The aim is to es-
timate the set of basic parameters Θ, from which the functional parameters
(ψ1, ψ2, . . . , ψn), as well as any other functions (ψn+1, . . . , ψm) of Θ that are
of interest, may be simultaneously derived. Denote the total set of functions
by Ψ.
Inference may be carried out either in a classical setting, maximising
the likelihood L(y|Θ) =
∏n
i=1Li(yi|Θ), or, as in this paper, in a Bayesian
setting, assigning a prior distribution to the basic parameters, P (Θ), and
obtaining the posterior distribution P (Θ|y)∝ P (Θ)L(y|Θ) typically via a
simulation-based algorithm such as Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC).
The posterior distribution of any of the functional parameters may also be
derived.
A Bayesian evidence synthesis meets the challenges of case-severity es-
timation by allowing the relationship between data and parameters to be
accurately formulated, for example, through the use of bias parameters such
as detection probabilities; prior information on such biases to be easily in-
troduced; and a natural framework in which to assess the consistency of
evidence [Presanis et al. (2013)], as part of the inference and model criti-
cism cycle advocated by Box (1980) and O’Hagan (2003).
4. A general Bayesian model for severity. The following generic syn-
thesis of evidence to estimate severity was the basis of the estimation of
severity of the 2009 pandemic A/H1N1 strain of influenza [Presanis et al.
(2009, 2011b)], both in the USA and in England during the first two waves.
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Assume the population of interest is divided into 7 age groups:< 1, 1–4, 5–
14, 15–24, 25–44, 45–64, 65+, indexed by a ∈ 1, . . . ,7. Denote the age-specific
population sizes by Nw,a, where w indexes waves of infection (w = 1,2,3 in
the case of England). Consider infections at five increasing severity levels:
all infections (Inf ), symptomatic infections (S), hospitalisations (H), ICU
admissions (I) and deaths (D). For each wave and age-group, consider each
of these sets of infections to be subsets of the set of infections at a less severe
level, such that D ⊆H and I ⊆H ⊆ S ⊆ Inf . Note that we assume the set
of deaths is a subset of the set of hospitalisations, but that not all deaths
are a subset of the set of ICU admissions. The set of infections Inf is clearly
a subset of the population. For each age group a, denote the cumulative
number of new infections during wave w at severity level l (i.e., the size of
subset l) by Nw,a,l.
4.1. Parameterisation. Denote by cw,a,l|λ the age- and wave-specific con-
ditional probability that a case is at severity level l given the case has al-
ready reached a less severe level λ, that is, l⊆ λ. For l= S,H, I , let Nw,a,l =
cw,a,l|λ ×Nw,a,λ, where λ= Inf , S,H , respectively. For all infections, define
Nw,a,Inf = cw,a,Inf |Pop ×Nw,a. For deaths, define Nw,a,D = cw,a,D|H ×Nw,a,H ,
that is, in terms of the conditional probability of dying given hospitali-
sation. The conditional probabilities cw,a,Inf |Pop , cw,a,S|Inf , cw,a,H|S, cw,a,I|H
and cw,a,D|H are basic parameters to which we assign prior distributions and
the Nw,a,l are functional parameters. Note that in the US analysis [Presanis
et al. (2009)], the Nw,a,l were considered stochastic nodes, realisations of a
Binomial distribution with probability parameter cw,a,l|λ and an appropriate
denominator Nw,a,λ. However, in the UK analysis [Presanis et al. (2011b)]
and the analyses reported below, convergence of the MCMC algorithm was
only achieved when the corresponding deterministic (mean) assumption was
made for the Nw,a,l, for reasons that are discussed further in Section 7.
The subsetting assumptions allow the case-hospitalisation, case-ICU ad-
mission and case-fatality risks to be defined as functional parameters ex-
pressed as products of component conditional probabilities:
CHRw,a = cw,a,H|Inf = cw,a,H|S × cw,a,S|Inf ,
CIRw,a = cw,a,I|Inf = cw,a,I|H × cw,a,H|S × cw,a,S|Inf ,(1)
CFRw,a = cw,a,D|Inf = cw,a,D|H × cw,a,H|S × cw,a,S|Inf .
Similarly, the symptomatic case-ICU admission and symptomatic case-fatality
risks are defined as
sCHRw,a = cw,a,H|S,
sCIRw,a = cw,a,I|S = cw,a,I|H × cw,a,H|S,(2)
sCFRw,a = cw,a,D|S = cw,a,D|H × cw,a,H|S.
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The conditional probability cw,a,Inf |Pop is commonly referred to as the “infec-
tion attack rate” (IARw,a) and cw,a,S|Pop = cw,a,S|Inf × cw,a,Inf ,Pop is known
as the “symptomatic attack rate,” SARw,a.
Let dw,a,l denote “detection” probabilities, that is, probabilities that in-
fections at severity level l are observed. The full set of wave- and age-specific
basic parameters to which we assign a prior distribution is then
θ(w,a) = {IARw,a, cw,a,S|Inf , cw,a,H|S, cw,a,I|H , cw,a,D|H , dw,a,S, dw,a,H ,
dw,a,I , dw,a,D},
with the total set defined as
Θ=
⋃
w,a
θ(w,a).
The full set of wave- and age-specific functional parameters is
ψ(w,a) = {SARw,a,CHRw,a, sCHRw,a,CIRw,a, sCIRw,a,CFRw,a, sCFRw,a,
Nw,a,Inf ,Nw,a,S,Nw,a,H ,Nw,a,I ,Nw,a,D},
with the total set defined as
Ψ=
⋃
w,a
ψ(w,a).
4.2. Prior distribution. The prior distributions assigned to the basic pa-
rameters, whether diffuse or informative, will depend on the specifics of the
severity model considered; see Section 5.
4.3. Data and likelihood. In general, at each severity level l, we observe
Ow,a,l infections out of the Nw,a,l total infections. Each Ow,a,l is assumed to
be Binomially distributed with size parameter Nw,a,l and detection proba-
bility dw,a,l:
Ow,a,l ∼ Bin(Nw,a,l, dw,a,l).
The likelihood would then be
L(y|Θ) =
∏
w,a,l
(
Nw,a,l
Ow,a,l
)
d
Ow,a,l
w,a,l (1− dw,a,l)
Nw,a,l−Ow,a,l .
The specific models, for example, as in Sections 5.1 and 5.2, may have
variations on this likelihood, depending on the data available. For example,
data may be directly available on the number of hospitalisations resulting
in ICU admission, in which case these data may contribute to the likelihood
in the following form:
Ow,a,I ∼ Bin(Ow,a,H , cw,a,I|H).
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Fig. 1. Schematic DAG for the severity model, first two waves, for one age group.
4.4. Computation. Once the priors and likelihood are defined, samples
are obtained from the resulting joint posterior distribution by MCMC sim-
ulation, using OpenBUGS [Lunn et al. (2009)]. In each model described
below, three independent chains were run for 2,000,000 iterations each, with
the first 500,000 iterations discarded as a burn-in period and the remain-
der thinned to every 10th iteration, resulting in 450,000 samples on which
to base posterior inference. Convergence was established by both visual in-
spection of the trace plots and examination of the Brooks–Gelman–Rubin
diagnostic plots [Brooks and Gelman (1998)].
5. The severity model in England. The model used in Presanis et al.
(2011b) for the first two waves of infection in England is described in the
next section. Two alternative methods of modelling the third wave of infec-
tion are then given: (a) a two-stage approach where posterior distributions
from the second wave model are used to inform prior distributions for some
of the conditional probabilities in the third wave; and (b) a one-stage ap-
proach where all three waves are modelled simultaneously, with the third
wave conditional probabilities parameterised in terms of the corresponding
second wave probabilities.
5.1. First & second waves. Figure 1 is a schematic Directed Acyclic
Graph (DAG) displaying the relationship between parameters and data in
the model for severity in the first two waves in England [Presanis et al.
(2011b)]. The figure displays one generic example age group, with the a
and w indices left out for simplicity. Parameters are denoted by circles and
data by rectangles. The dashed rectangle represents repetition over the two
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waves w ∈ {1,2}. Double circles are basic parameters which are assigned
prior distributions, either vague or informative, and filled light grey circles
denote the key parameters (both basic and functional) we wish to estimate.
Dashed arrows denote functional relationships, for example, the definition
of each number Nw,a,l = cw,a,l|λ×Nw,a,λ or equations (1) and (2). Solid ar-
rows represent distributional assumptions, for example, that an observation
is Binomially distributed.
5.1.1. Prior distribution. Independently for each age group, a vague
Dirichlet(1,1,1) prior distribution is given to the infection attack rate,
IARw,a, in each of the two waves, together with the remaining fraction of
the population, comprising those either uninfected in the first two waves or
with some degree of immunity at baseline:(
IAR1,a, IAR2,a,1−
2∑
w=1
IARw,a
)
∼Dirich(1,1,1).
The three proportions are therefore constrained a priori to sum to 1 and to
lie between 0 and 1. This parameterisation assumes each infected individual
was infected in only a single wave. The remaining priors are either Uniform or
Beta distributions, with full details given in Section 2.2 of the supplementary
material [Presanis et al. (2014)].
5.1.2. Likelihood. The likelihood is a product of binomial and log-normal
contributions, as detailed in the following.
Infections. The sero-prevalence data [source (iii) of Section 2] consist of
the number of samples testing positive for pandemic A/H1N1 antibodies,
both before and after the first wave. They are realisations of two bino-
mial distributions and provide information on the corresponding prevalences
at the two time points. The difference in these two prevalences informs
the infection attack rate in the first wave, via the functional relationship
pi1,a = pibaseline,a + IAR1,a (Figure 1). The post-second wave sero-prevalence
data were not used initially, as some samples taken after the vaccination
campaign had begun were likely to test positive due to vaccination rather
than infection. A lack of information on the vaccination status of individuals
in the sample, together with concerns that individuals in the sample may
have been more likely than the general population to be at risk of infection,
due to pre-existing conditions, and therefore to be vaccinated [Miller et al.
(2010), Bird (2010)], precluded the use of the data without further work to
address these challenges.
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Symptomatic infections. The estimates Oˆw,a,S (Figure 1) of the number
symptomatic from the HPA (source (ii), Section 1.1.2 of the supplementary
material [Presanis et al. (2014)]) are assumed to be log-normally distributed,
with a mean that (on the original scale) is drawn from a binomial distribution
with size parameter Nw,a,S and probability parameter given by the detection
probability dw,a,S . This parameterisation reflects the belief that the HPA
estimates are underestimates of the number symptomatic Nw,a,S .
Hospitalisations and deaths. The observed hospitalisations Ow,a,H and
deaths Ow,a,D [sources (iv) and (v), resp., see also Figure 1] are binomial real-
isations, with size parameters Nw,a,l, l ∈ {H,D} and probability parameters
given by their respective (wave- but not age-specific) detection probabilities
dw,ℓ. Amongst observed hospitalisations for whom we have information on
final outcomes [a subset of source (iv)], the observed ICU admissions and
deaths are realisations of binomial distributions with probability parame-
ters given by the conditional probabilities cw,a,I|H and cw,a,D|H , respectively
(Figure 1). Fuller details of the model are given in Section 2 of the supple-
mentary material [Presanis et al. (2014)].
5.2. The third wave: A two-stage approach. The changes in surveillance
sources available during the third wave, particularly the smaller sample sizes
and coarser age aggregation, resulted in the data providing less direct in-
formation on the parameters than in the first two waves. To ensure identifi-
ability of all parameters, informative prior distributions were employed for
some parameters. The darker grey circles in Figure 2, a DAG of the third
wave model, denote these parameters, with Beta prior distributions chosen
to reflect the posterior distributions of the equivalent second wave param-
eters (see Table 15 of the supplementary material [Presanis et al. (2014)]).
The changes also entailed two smaller submodels, one for the data on ICU
patients with suspected pandemic A/H1N1 infection and one for general
practice (GP) consultation and positivity data, the results of which are in-
corporated into the third wave severity model as likelihood terms (see below
for more detail).
Infections. The infection attack rate again has a Dirichlet prior over the
three waves, but it is now more informative:
(pi2,a, IAR3,a,1− pi2,a − IAR3,a)∼Dirich(2xa/ya,1,1),
where pi2,a is the proportion either with antibodies at baseline or infected
during one of the first two waves, that is, the post-second wave antibody
prevalence. For each age group a, xa and ya are chosen such that a Beta(xa,
ya) distribution approximates the marginal posterior distribution of pi2,a
derived from the model of Section 5.1. The choice of Dirichlet parameters
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Fig. 2. Schematic DAG for the severity model, third wave, for one age group.
allows the prior mean for pi2,a to reflect the posterior mean from Section 5.1,
but gives greater prior uncertainty than the corresponding posterior.
Symptomatic infections. As the HPA did not produce estimates of the
number symptomatic during the third wave, data on ILI consultations and
virological positivity from an alternative primary care sentinel surveillance
system ([Fleming (1999)]; see Section 1.2.1 of the supplementary material
[Presanis et al. (2014)]) were used to estimate the number symptomatic,
before incorporating this estimate into the severity model. A log-linear re-
gression of the ILI consultation data on time and age was fitted jointly with
a logistic regression of the positivity data on time and age [cf. Birrell et al.
(2011)]. A negative binomial likelihood was assumed for the consultation
data and a binomial likelihood for the positivity data. The number symp-
tomatic due to the pandemic A/H1N1 strain was then estimated as the
sum over weeks of the product of the expected consultation rate and the
expected proportion positive for pandemic A/H1N1, adjusted for the pro-
portion of symptomatic patients who contact primary care. The resulting
posterior mean (Oˆ′3,a,S) and standard deviation (σ
′
3,a,S) of the logarithm of
the number symptomatic are incorporated into the likelihood of the third
wave severity model as a normal term:
Oˆ′3,a,S ∼N(log(N3,a,S), σ
′2
3,a,S)
(see Section 3.1 of the supplementary material [Presanis et al. (2014)] for
details).
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Hospitalisations. The hospitalisation data for the third wave (source (vi),
Section 1.2.2 of the supplementary material [Presanis et al. (2014)]) come
from a sentinel system. The observed number of hospitalisations therefore
provides a lower bound for the number of hospitalisations, contributing
to the total likelihood as a binomial component with probability param-
eter given by the (non-age specific) detection probability d3,H . Recall that
these data are available at a coarser age aggregation than in the first two
waves. The size parameter is therefore a functional parameter N∗3,b,H =∑
a∈Ab,H
N3,a,H that is a sum over the appropriate age groups a ∈ Ab,H ,
where Ab,H are sets describing the mapping from the coarser age groups b
to the severity model age groups a.
ICU admissions. The extra information on suspected patients present
in ICU (source (vii), Section 1.2.3 of the supplementary material [Presa-
nis et al. (2014)]) are modelled as a bivariate immigration-death process to
represent movement in and out of ICU. This process is combined with the
positivity data of source (viii) to estimate the cumulative number of con-
firmed pandemic A/H1N1 incident cases admitted to ICU during the third
wave (Section 4 of the supplementary material [Presanis et al. (2014)]). The
resulting posterior mean (standard deviation) of the logarithm of the cumu-
lative ICU admissions, Oˆ′3,b,I(σ
′
3,b,I), are incorporated in the likelihood for
the third wave severity model as normally distributed:
Oˆ′3,b,I ∼N(log(N
∗
3,b,I), σ
′2
3,b,I),
where b denotes the age groups available for the suspected ICU data (two
groups: children and adults). As with the hospitalisation data, the N∗3,b,I =∑
a∈Ab,I
N∗3,a,I are sums over the appropriate age groups. The number N
∗
w,a,I
is still a lower bound for the cumulative number of ICU admissions over the
third wave, since the data of source (vii) cover only a portion of the time
of the third wave: this is expressed as having a binomial distribution with
size parameter Nw,a,I and probability parameter given by the age-constant
detection probability dw,I .
Deaths. Finally, the observed deaths are again binomially distributed, as
in the first two waves. Full details of the changes to model the third wave
are given in Section 3 of the supplementary material [Presanis et al. (2014)].
5.3. Modelling all three waves simultaneously. Modelling the three waves
of infection in two stages enables the use of the posterior distributions of
case-severity in the second wave as prior distributions in the third wave
analysis. However, a two-stage approach does not allow estimation of the
posterior probability of a change in severity occurring over waves. To do so
requires modelling all three waves simultaneously, as if we had not seen any
of the data until the end of the third wave.
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A joint model for all three waves implies different assumptions from the
two-stage approach. First, the prior distribution for the infection attack rates
in each wave is assumed again to be diffuse:(
IAR1,a, IAR2,a, IAR3,a,1−
3∑
w=1
IARw,a
)
∼Dirich(1,1,1,1).
Here, the remaining fraction of the population 1−
∑3
w=1 IARw,a comprises
both those with antibodies at baseline (pre-pandemic) and those remaining
uninfected by the end of the third wave.
The proportion symptomatic, cS|Inf , is now constrained to be equal across
all three waves and all age groups, instead of its third wave prior being in-
formed by its second wave posterior distribution. Likewise, the three condi-
tional probabilities sCHRw,a = cw,a,H|S, cw,a,I|H and cw,a,D|H for w = 3 are
no longer given prior distributions based on second wave posterior distri-
butions, but are parameterised in terms of their corresponding second wave
conditional probabilities:
logit(c3,a,l|λ)∼N(logit(c2,a,l|λ), τ
2
l|λ)
for each (l|λ) ∈ {(H|S), (I|H), (D|H)},(3)
τl|λ ∼Unif[0,1].
A value of τ = 1 for the standard deviations would imply that the odds ratios
of the third compared to the second wave probabilities lie between 0.14 and
7.10. A value of τ = 0 would imply an odds ratio of 1, that is, equality of
the conditional probabilities: c3,a,l|λ = c2,a,l|λ.
All other aspects of the joint model for all three waves are as in the sepa-
rate first/second and third wave models of Sections 5.1 and 5.2, respectively.
6. Results. Results from the model for the first two waves, given in full
in Presanis et al. (2011b), suggest a mild pandemic, characterised by case-
severity risks increasing between the two waves. From the analysis of data
from the third wave, Figures 3 and 4 show the posterior medians and 95%
credible intervals for the case-severity risks and infection attack rates, respec-
tively, by age, wave and model. Although there are some differences between
the two-stage models (left-hand sides of the figures) and the combined three-
wave model (right-hand sides), the conclusions are broadly similar. There
is a clear “u”-shape to the age distribution of the case-severity risks (Fig-
ure 3) in all three waves, with the youngest and oldest age groups having
the highest probabilities of experiencing severe events, but also the most un-
certainty in the estimates. The age distribution of the infection attack rates
(Figure 4), on the other hand, is convex, with school-age children having the
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Fig. 3. CHR,CIR and CFR by age, wave and model. Note the different scales on the
y-axes.
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Fig. 4. Infection attack rate by age, wave and model.
highest probability of being infected in the first two waves, though not the
third.
The joint three-wave model allows estimation of the posterior probabili-
ties of increases across waves in either the attack rates or the case-severity
risks (Table 1). Across waves, there is some evidence of a shift in the age dis-
tribution of the infection attack rates, with posterior probabilities p≥ 0.85
of an increase from the second to third waves seen in adults and the very
young, but not in school-age children (posterior probability p= 0.13).
At first glance, the estimates averaged over the age groups (Table 1) sug-
gest the case-severity risks have increased over all three waves. The posterior
probabilities of a rise across waves of the CIR and CFR are all greater than
73%. However, closer scrutiny of the age-specific estimates shows this in-
crease does not occur consistently in every age group and wave. There is
stronger evidence of a rise in ICU admission and fatalities from the first to
second waves than from the second to third. The pattern is less clear in the
case-hospitalisation risks.
The reason for the pattern of increase in the CIR and CFR over waves
is not immediately apparent without further investigation. Three possible
hypotheses are as follows: (a) that the increase is due to the age shift in
the infection attack rate away from school-age children toward adults across
waves; (b) that the lack of third wave data and consequent parameteri-
sation of some of the third wave conditional probabilities in terms of the
corresponding second wave probabilities [equation (3)] results in the atten-
uated change in severity from the second to third wave; and/or (c) that
unaccounted differences in the representativeness of the different surveil-
lance systems used in the third wave compared to the first two may have
SYNTHESISING EVIDENCE TO ESTIMATE INFLUENZA SEVERITY 17
Table 1
Posterior probabilities, by age, that the IAR,CHR,CIR,CFR, cI|H and cD|H are greater
in (a) wave 2 vs wave 1, (b) wave 3 vs wave 2, and (c) wave 3 vs wave 1
Age Pr(W2 > W1) Pr(W3 >W2) Pr(W3 >W1)
IAR <1 19% 87% 71%
1–4 96% 85% 99%
5–14 99% 13% 77%
15–24 94% 96% 100%
25–44 96% 100% 100%
45–64 100% 99% 100%
65+ 95% 99% 100%
All ages 100% 99% 100%
CHR <1 96% 62% 95%
1–4 60% 57% 64%
5–14 26% 27% 13%
15–24 37% 48% 39%
25–44 47% 36% 38%
45–64 19% 52% 24%
65+ 60% 63% 68%
All ages 30% 79% 54%
CIR <1 98% 62% 97%
1–4 86% 58% 86%
5–14 43% 34% 31%
15–24 34% 31% 27%
25–44 91% 36% 82%
45–64 80% 14% 50%
65+ 98% 11% 89%
All ages 90% 73% 95%
CFR <1 58% 69% 70%
1–4 74% 64% 80%
5–14 38% 82% 66%
15–24 60% 24% 41%
25–44 86% 35% 77%
45–64 61% 52% 61%
65+ 74% 40% 67%
All ages 76% 90% 93%
cI|H <1 90% 54% 90%
1–4 85% 54% 85%
5–14 65% 53% 66%
15–24 39% 32% 28%
25–44 100% 43% 99%
45–64 100% 0% 93%
65+ 99% 1% 87%
All ages 100% 35% 100%
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Table 1
(Continued)
Age Pr(W2 >W1) Pr(W3 >W2) Pr(W3 >W1)
cD|H <1 26% 62% 31%
1–4 71% 61% 76%
5–14 52% 96% 93%
15–24 69% 20% 46%
25–44 94% 43% 91%
45–64 90% 51% 89%
65+ 72% 20% 54%
All ages 97% 85% 98%
an effect on the estimated severity. These possibilities are not mutually ex-
clusive and the extent to which the estimated severity is reliant on each is
unknown.
6.1. Sensitivity analyses. The potential for unaccounted biases in the
sero-prevalence data (Sections 2 and 5.1.2), as well as the belief that the
HPA case estimates represented underestimates, prompted several sensitiv-
ity analyses to further assess the uncertainty in the infection attack rates in
the first two waves. Sensitivity to the choice of data informing the denomina-
tors (the infection attack rate IARw,a or the number of symptomatic infec-
tions Nw,a,S) and to the prior distribution of IARw,a was assessed. Specif-
ically, four models with different data informing IARw,a and Nw,a,S were
considered:
1. using the HPA case estimates to inform Nw,a,S , assuming they do so
unbiasedly in the first two waves (i.e., with dw,a,S = 1), and using no sero-
prevalence data;
2. the model presented here and in Presanis et al. (2011b), assuming the
HPA case estimates are biased downwards and using only the baseline and
post-first wave sero-prevalence data;
3. as in model 2, but using all the sero-prevalence data (up to post-second
wave) of Table 5 of Section 1.1.3 of the supplementary material [Presanis
et al. (2014)], assuming the HPA case estimates are biased downwards in
both waves; and
4. as in model 3, but assuming the sero-prevalence data are biased up-
wards and the HPA case estimates are biased downwards.
Analyses using models 1 and 2 were then repeated using three different prior
distributions for the infection attack rate:
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a. Dirichlet(2,2,6), allowing the total attack rate over the two waves to
be a priori 0.4 on average, with 95% prior mass in the interval (0.1–0.7),
and with a 1 : 1 ratio between the two waves;
b. Dirichlet(2.67,1.33,6), allowing again a prior total attack rate of 0.4
(0.1–0.7), but with a 2 : 1 ratio between waves;
c. Dirichlet(1.33,2.67,6), allowing a prior total attack rate of 0.4 (0.1–
0.7), with a 1 : 2 ratio between waves.
The choice of informative priors is motivated by the total attack rates in
prior pandemics, with the prior uncertainty still relatively large. Jackson,
Vynnycky and Mangtani (2010) found susceptible attack rates (i.e., propor-
tion of susceptibles infected, as opposed to proportion of the total popula-
tion) of between 19 and 58% in the first wave of the 1968–1969 pandemic,
compared to between 15 and 50% in the second, which motivates prior (b).
This prior may in fact be sceptical for the 2009 pandemic, as instead of a
2 : 1 ratio between waves, the HPA case estimates and the severe data sug-
gest the ratio was at least 1 : 1, if not 1 : 2 or greater. However, this ratio
may vary by both age and region, with London in particular experiencing a
somewhat different epidemic to the rest of the country [Birrell et al. (2011)].
Prior (c) therefore allows for the converse, with a greater second wave than
first.
The sensitivity analyses to the choice of prior distribution of the infection
attack rate in the first two waves suggest the key messages from Presanis
et al. (2011b) are robust to the choice of prior distribution. Results were
less robust to the choice of denominator data included in the model. The
inclusion of the post-second wave sero-prevalence data suggested a higher
infection attack rate [28.4% (26.0–30.8%)] than the baseline analysis [11.2%
(7.4–18.9%)], with a corresponding lower case-fatality risk in the second
wave [0.0027% (0.0024–0.0031%) compared to 0.009% (0.004–0.014%)]. Full
details of these sensitivity analyses are given in Section 5 of the supplemen-
tary material [Presanis et al. (2014)]. Recall (Section 5.1.2) that the samples
tested post-second wave and before and after the third wave [Hoschler et al.
(2012)] may overrepresent individuals at higher risk of infection and vacci-
nation. The observed sero-prevalence in these samples may therefore suggest
a higher infection attack rate than truly occurred. Further work to obtain
background information on individuals in the samples, and therefore to ac-
count for sampling biases, is underway, prompted in part by the results of
these sensitivity analyses.
In the third wave, a sensitivity analysis to the set of virological positivity
data used was performed (Sections 1.2.1 and 3.1 of the supplementary mate-
rial [Presanis et al. (2014)]). The main analysis used the full positivity data,
with the results of the Bayesian joint regression model of the positivity and
primary care consultation data (Table 13 of the supplementary material)
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Fig. 5. Third wave CHR,CIR and CFR from the combined model, by age and source of
positivity data. Note the different scales on the y-axes.
incorporated into the combined 3-wave model as shown in Figure 2 and Sec-
tion 3.1 of the supplementary material. The sensitivity analysis employed
instead a set of virological positivity data restricted to tests made on swabs
that were collected within 5 days of an ILI consultation, with corresponding
results from the joint regression model in Table 14 of the supplementary ma-
terial. The results from including the two alternative sets of estimates from
the joint regression model into the combined 3-wave model are compared in
Figures 5 and 6.
The general conclusions about the age distribution of the case-severity
risks and infection attack rate in the third wave are unchanged by the use
of the restricted positivity data. The restricted data do imply a slightly
higher and more uncertain attack rate in each age group (Figure 6), due
to the higher observed positivity and smaller sample sizes. Correspondingly,
the case-severity risks are slightly lower in each age group in the sensitivity
analysis (Figure 5), but the greater uncertainty in the denominator does not
seem to translate directly into greater uncertainty in the risks.
7. Discussion. We have extended and further developed a Bayesian evi-
dence synthesis model [Presanis et al. (2011b)] to characterise and estimate
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Fig. 6. Third wave infection attack rate from the combined model, by age and positivity
data set used.
the severity of the 2009 pandemic A/H1N1 strain of influenza in the three
waves of infection experienced in England. The model has been adapted
to account for changes in the surveillance data available over the course of
the three waves, considering two approaches: (a) a two-stage approach, using
posterior distributions from the model for the first two waves to inform prior
distributions for the third wave analysis; and (b) modelling all three waves
simultaneously, accounting for the reduction in available data by param-
eterising the third wave severity parameters in terms of the corresponding
second wave parameters. Both approaches have resulted in broadly the same
three key conclusions:
1. The age distribution in case-severity risks is “u”-shaped, implying chil-
dren aged less than a year and older adults have highest severity, although
their estimates are also the most uncertain. This pattern is consistent with
the increasing severity with age seen in other countries during the 2009 pan-
demic [Presanis et al. (2009), Wu et al. (2010), Sypsa et al. (2011), Shubin
et al. (2013), Wong et al. (2013)], where in each of these analyses, the au-
thors did not distinguish between children under 1 year of age and those aged
1–4. The pattern is also consistent with global relative risks by age of severe
events compared to the general population estimated by Van Kerkhove et al.
(2011).
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2. The age distribution of the infection attack rate changes over waves,
with school-age children most affected in the first two waves and an increase
in the attack rate in adults aged 25 and older from the second to third waves.
3. When averaged over all ages, severity in those infected appears to
increase over the three waves.
The changing age distribution and apparent increase in severity over waves
is consistent with estimates from the two pandemic waves experienced by
other countries [Yang et al. (2011), Truelove et al. (2011), Shubin et al.
(2013)].
It is important to note that the estimates presented here do not account
for risk factors for severe influenza, nor for vaccination status nor for other
preventive measures, such as social distancing, which might have an effect
on severity. Both the joint regression model of virological positivity and GP
consultation and the full severity model would require further development
to account for these factors and to be able to use the second and third
wave serology data accounting for sampling biases. Assessment of the effect
on estimates of assumptions—such as that of no influenza-related deaths
occurring outside of hospital or the parameterisation of the third wave in
terms of the second wave in the combined analysis—is also key. The possi-
ble effect of any differences in representativeness of the various surveillance
systems in the third compared to the first two waves is an issue for fur-
ther investigation. The sample sizes and prior distributions chosen do not
provide enough information to enable convergence of the MCMC algorithm
for the severity model when taking the number of infections Nw,a,l to be a
Binomial realisation from the number at a less severe level λ. This lack of
convergence implies there may be too much uncertainty to allow identifi-
ability of the model in this case, prompting instead the mean assumption
Nw,a,l = cw,a,l|λ ×Nw,a,λ. Another area for future investigation is to assess
how informative the priors are required to be or how large sample sizes need
to be to enable convergence when the Nw,a,λ are stochastic.
Despite these challenges, our Bayesian evidence synthesis approach has
allowed us to draw important public health conclusions, not only in char-
acterising the severity of the 2009 pandemic, but also in shaping future
research. The sensitivity analyses showed the severity estimates were ro-
bust to prior assumptions about the infection attack rate, but less robust
to the choice of data to include in informing the attack rate. Although the
magnitude of the severity estimates varied, the conclusions of a “u”-shaped
age distribution to severity and an apparent increase in severity over waves
were nevertheless robust. The sensitivity of the results has, furthermore,
contributed to the initiation of a project to obtain further data to better
understand the potential sampling bias in the sero-prevalence data [Laurie
et al. (2013)].
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The evidence synthesis framework has also given us the flexibility to ac-
count for biases, using prior information on parameters representing the
biases, for example. Bias modelling has been an integral part of the model
development, inference and criticism cycle, as have the sensitivity analyses.
It is important, in any analysis, to understand the contribution of each item
of evidence, whether in the form of model structure, prior distribution or
data, in driving inferences. It is particularly crucial when an analysis relies
on informative priors for identifiability, as is the case here. Another key as-
pect of model criticism in an evidence synthesis is to assess the consistency of
the various data sources, not only with each other, but also with the model
structure. It is possible, and indeed common, in syntheses of multiple sources
of evidence to find both that some parameters are only barely identified by
the data and that other parameters are informed indirectly by more than one
data item. In the latter case, there is clearly potential for different sources of
data to conflict, providing inconsistent evidence on a particular parameter
[Lu and Ades (2006), Sweeting et al. (2008), Presanis et al. (2008)]. Such
conflicts need to be detected, measured, understood and resolved. Conflict
diagnostics, in the form of cross-validatory posterior prediction, for the first
wave confirm the inconsistency between the serology data and the HPA es-
timates of the number symptomatic if taken at face value [Presanis et al.
(2013)]. In our main analysis, we addressed the conflict by incorporating a
bias parameter for the HPA estimates, whereas in the sensitivity analyses,
we also considered a bias parameter for the serology data. Further prelim-
inary work on measuring conflict seems to confirm the suggestion of the
sensitivity analyses that the severe end data does indeed conflict with the
evidence on the attack rates. Given the uncertainties in the attack rates,
understanding and resolving this conflict is an important next step. The
iterative process of fitting, criticising and further developing an evidence
synthesis model to address conflicts, as we have done and are continuing to
do here, leads automatically to internal consistency. By contrast, external
validation is much more challenging in an evidence synthesis framework. As
already noted, due to identifiability issues common to evidence syntheses, it
is rare to find external data against which to validate—such data are instead
used in the synthesis.
Despite these challenges, an evidence synthesis using a complex proba-
bilistic model provides a powerful approach to estimating influenza severity
when the available evidence comes from multiple sources that are incomplete
and biased. The embedding of a “pyramid” approach to severity estimation
within an evidence synthesis framework, as presented here, is easily adapted
to other contexts, both within epidemiology, where many diseases may be
observed at different levels of severity or diagnosis, and in other fields where
observation occurs at different levels, for example, quality control or ecology.
24 PRESANIS ET AL.
Acknowledgements. We thank colleagues at Public Health England and
the Royal College of General Practitioners, particularly Michele Barley, who
provided data for this analysis. We are grateful to all GPs who participate in
the RCGP Weekly Returns Service. We would particularly like to acknowl-
edge Professor J. R. Norris (University of Cambridge) and Professor Marc
Lipsitch (Harvard School of Public Health) for advice on early versions of
this analysis.
SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL
Appendix: Synthesising evidence to estimate pandemic (2009) A/H1N1
influenza severity in 2009–2011 (DOI: 10.1214/14-AOAS775SUPP; .pdf).
Appendix describing the data, further model details and sensitivity analyses.
REFERENCES
Ades, A. E. and Sutton, A. J. (2006). Multiparameter evidence synthesis in epidemiol-
ogy and medical decision-making: Current approaches. J. Roy. Statist. Soc. Ser. A 169
5–35. MR2222010
Albert, I., Espie´, E., de Valk, H. and Denis, J.-B. B. (2011). A Bayesian evidence
synthesis for estimating campylobacteriosis prevalence. Risk Analysis 31 1141–1155.
Bird, S. M. (2010). Like-with-like comparisons? The Lancet 376 684+.
Birrell, P. J., Ketsetzis, G., Gay, N. J., Cooper, B. S., Presanis, A. M., Har-
ris, R. J., Charlett, A., Zhang, X.-S., White, P. J., Pebody, R. G. and De An-
gelis, D. (2011). Bayesian modeling to unmask and predict influenza A/H1N1pdm
dynamics in London. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA 108 18238–18243.
Box, G. E. P. (1980). Sampling and Bayes’ inference in scientific modelling and robust-
ness. J. Roy. Statist. Soc. Ser. A 143 383–430. MR0603745
Brooks, S. P. and Gelman, A. (1998). General methods for monitoring convergence of
iterative simulations. J. Comput. Graph. Statist. 7 434–455. MR1665662
Campbell, C. N. J.,Mytton, O. T.,McLean, E. M., Rutter, P. D., Pebody, R. G.,
Sachedina, N., White, P. J., Hawkins, C., Evans, B., Waight, P. A., Ellis, J.,
Bermingham, A., Donaldson, L. J. and Catchpole, M. (2011). Hospitalization in
two waves of pandemic influenza A(H1N1) in England. Epidemiology and Infection 139
1560–1569.
Department of Health (2011). Department of Health Winter Watch. Accessed 25/02/2011.
Donaldson, L. J., Rutter, P. D., Ellis, B. M., Greaves, F. E. C., Mytton, O. T.,
Pebody, R. G. and Yardley, I. E. (2009). Mortality from pandemic A/H1N1 2009
influenza in England: Public health surveillance study. BMJ 339 b5213.
Eddy, D. M., Hasselblad, V. and Shachter, R. (1992). Meta-Analysis by the Confi-
dence Profile Method. Academic Press, Boston, MA.
Fleming, D. M. (1999). Weekly returns service of the royal college of general practitioners.
Communicable Disease and Public Health / PHLS 2 96–100.
Garske, T., Legrand, J., Donnelly, C. A., Ward, H., Cauchemez, S., Fraser, C.,
Ferguson, N. M. and Ghani, A. C. (2009). Assessing the severity of the novel in-
fluenza A/H1N1 pandemic. BMJ 339 b2840.
Goubar, A., Ades, A. E., De Angelis, D., McGarrigle, C. A., Mercer, C. H.,
Tookey, P. A., Fenton, K. and Gill, O. N. (2008). Estimates of human immunod-
eficiency virus prevalence and proportion diagnosed based on Bayesian multiparameter
synthesis of surveillance data. J. Roy. Statist. Soc. Ser. A 171 541–580. MR2432503
SYNTHESISING EVIDENCE TO ESTIMATE INFLUENZA SEVERITY 25
Hardelid, P., Andrews, N. J., Hoschler, K., Stanford, E., Baguelin, M.,
Waight, P. A., Zambon, M. and Miller, E. (2011). Assessment of baseline age-
specific antibody prevalence and incidence of infection to novel influenza A/H1N1 2009.
Health Technology Assessment 14 115–192.
Health Protection Agency (2010). Epidemiological report of pandemic (H1N1) 2009 in the
UK. Technical report, Health Protection Agency.
Health Protection Agency, Health Protection Scotland, Communicable Disease Surveil-
lance Centre Northern Ireland and National Public Health Service for Wales (2009).
First Few Hundred (FF100) Project: Epidemiological Protocols for Comprehensive As-
sessment of Early Swine Influenza Cases in the United Kingdom Technical report,
Health Protection Agency.
Hoschler, K., Thompson, C., Andrews, N., Galiano, M., Pebody, R., Ellis, J.,
Stanford, E., Baguelin, M., Miller, E. and Zambon, M. (2012). Seroprevalence
of influenza A(H1N1)pdm09 virus antibody, England, 2010 and 2011. Emerging Infect.
Dis. 18 1894–1897.
Jackson, C., Vynnycky, E. andMangtani, P. (2010). Estimates of the transmissibility
of the 1968 (Hong Kong) influenza pandemic: Evidence of increased transmissibility
between successive waves. Am. J. Epidemiol. 171 465–478.
Laurie, K. L., Huston, P., Riley, S., Katz, J. M., Willison, D. J., Tam, J. S.,
Mounts, A. W., Hoschler, K., Miller, E., Vandemaele, K., Broberg, E., Van
Kerkhove, M. D. andNicoll, A. (2013). Influenza serological studies to inform public
health action: Best practices to optimise timing, quality and reporting. Influenza Other
Respir Viruses 7 211–224.
Lipsitch, M., Riley, S., Cauchemez, S., Ghani, A. C. and Ferguson, N. M. (2009).
Managing and reducing uncertainty in an emerging influenza pandemic. New England
Journal of Medicine 361 112–115.
Lipsitch, M., Finelli, L., Heffernan, R. T., Leung, G. M., Redd, S. C. and for the
2009 H1N1 Surveillance Group (2011). Improving the evidence base for decision
making during a pandemic: The example of 2009 influenza A/H1N1. Biosecurity and
Bioterrorism: Biodefense Strategy, Practice, and Science 9 89–114.
Lu, G. and Ades, A. E. (2006). Assessing evidence inconsistency in mixed treatment
comparisons. J. Amer. Statist. Assoc. 101 447–459. MR2256166
Lunn, D., Spiegelhalter, D., Thomas, A. and Best, N. (2009). The BUGS project:
Evolution, critique and future directions. Stat. Med. 28 3049–3067. MR2750401
McDonald, S. A., Presanis, A. M., De Angelis, D., van der Hoek, W.,
Hooiveld, M., Donker, G. and Kretzschmar, M. E. (2014). An evidence syn-
thesis approach to estimating the incidence of seasonal influenza in the Netherlands.
Influenza Other Respi. Viruses 8 33–41.
Miller, M. A., Viboud, C., Balinska, M. and Simonsen, L. (2009). The signature
features of influenza pandemics–implications for policy. N. Engl. J. Med. 360 2595–
2598.
Miller, E., Hoschler, K., Hardelid, P., Stanford, E., Andrews, N. and Zam-
bon, M. (2010). Incidence of 2009 pandemic influenza A/H1N1 infection in England:
A cross-sectional serological study. The Lancet 375 1100–1108.
O’Hagan, A. (2003). HSSS model criticism. In Highly Structured Stochastic Systems.
Oxford Statist. Sci. Ser. 27 423–453. Oxford Univ. Press, Oxford. MR2082418
Pebody, R. G., McLean, E., Zhao, H., Cleary, P., Bracebridge, S., Foster, K.,
Charlett, A., Hardelid, P., Waight, P., Ellis, J., Bermingham, A., Zam-
bon, M., Evans, B., Salmon, R., McMenamin, J., Smyth, B., Catchpole, M. and
26 PRESANIS ET AL.
Watson, J. (2010). Pandemic influenza A(H1N1) 2009 and mortality in the United
Kingdom: Risk factors for death, April 2009 to March 2010. Euro Surveillance 15.
Presanis, A. M., De Angelis, D., Spiegelhalter, D. J., Seaman, S., Goubar, A.
and Ades, A. E. (2008). Conflicting evidence in a Bayesian synthesis of surveillance
data to estimate human immunodeficiency virus prevalence. J. Roy. Statist. Soc. Ser.
A 171 915–937. MR2530293
Presanis, A. M., De Angelis, D., New York City Swine Flu Investigation Team,
Hagy, A., Reed, C., Riley, S., Cooper, B. S., Finelli, L., Biedrzycki, P. and
Lipsitch, M. (2009). The severity of pandemic H1N1 influenza in the United States,
from April to July 2009: A Bayesian analysis. PLoS Med. 6 e1000207.
Presanis, A. M., De Angelis, D., Goubar, A., Gill, O. N. and Ades, A. E. (2011a).
Bayesian evidence synthesis for a transmission dynamic model for HIV among men who
have sex with men. Biostatistics 12 666–681.
Presanis, A. M., Pebody, R. G., Paterson, B. J., Tom, B. D. M., Birrell, P. J.,
Charlett, A., Lipsitch, M. and De Angelis, D. (2011b). Changes in severity of
2009 pandemic A/H1N1 influenza in England: A Bayesian evidence synthesis. BMJ
343.
Presanis, A. M., Ohlssen, D., Spiegelhalter, D. J. and De Angelis, D. (2013).
Conflict diagnostics in directed acyclic graphs, with applications in Bayesian evidence
synthesis. Statist. Sci. 28 376–397. MR3135538
Presanis, A. M., Pebody, R. G., Birrell, P. J., Tom, B. D. M., Green, H.,
Durnell, H., Fleming, D. and De Angelis, D. (2014). Supplement to “Synthe-
sising evidence to estimate pandemic (2009) A/H1N1 influenza severity in 2009–2011.”
DOI:10.1214/14-AOAS775SUPP.
Reed, C., Angulo, F. J., Swerdlow, D. L., Lipsitch, M., Meltzer, M. I., Jerni-
gan, D. and Finelli, L. (2009). Estimates of the prevalence of pandemic (H1N1) 2009,
United States, April–July 2009. Emerging Infect. Dis. 15 2004–2007.
Shubin, M., Virtanen, M., Toikkanen, S., Lyytika¨inen, O. and Auranen, K. (2013).
Estimating the burden of A(H1N1)pdm09 influenza in Finland during two seasons.
Epidemiology & Infection 142 964–974.
Spiegelhalter, D. J., Abrams, K. R. and Myles, J. P. (2004). Bayesian Approaches
to Clinical Trials and Health-Care Evaluation (Statistics in Practice). Wiley, New York.
Sweeting, M. J., De Angelis, D., Hickman, M. and Ades, A. E. (2008). Estimating
hepatitis C prevalence in England and Wales by synthesizing evidence from multiple
data sources. Assessing data conflict and model fit. Biostatistics 9 715–734.
Sypsa, V., Bonovas, S., Tsiodras, S., Baka, A., Efstathiou, P., Malliori, M.,
Panagiotopoulos, T., Nikolakopoulos, I. and Hatzakis, A. (2011). Estimating
the disease burden of 2009 pandemic influenza A(H1N1) from surveillance and house-
hold surveys in Greece. PLoS ONE 6 e20593.
Truelove, S. A., Chitnis, A. S., Heffernan, R. T., Karon, A. E., Haupt, T. E. and
Davis, J. P. (2011). Comparison of patients hospitalized with pandemic 2009 influenza
A(H1N1) virus infection during the first two pandemic waves in Wisconsin. J. Infect.
Dis. 203 828–837.
Van Kerkhove, M. D., Vandemaele, K. A. H., Shinde, V., Jaramillo-
Gutierrez, G., Koukounari, A., Donnelly, C. A., Carlino, L. O., Owen, R.,
Paterson, B., Pelletier, L., Vachon, J., Gonzalez, C., Hongjie, Y., Zijian, F.,
Chuang, S. K., Au, A., Buda, S., Krause, G., Haas, W., Bonmarin, I., Tanigu-
ichi, K., Nakajima, K., Shobayashi, T., Takayama, Y., Sunagawa, T., Her-
aud, J. M., Orelle, A., Palacios, E., van der Sande, M. A. B., Wield-
ers, C. C. H. L., Hunt, D., Cutter, J., Lee, V. J., Thomas, J., Santa-
SYNTHESISING EVIDENCE TO ESTIMATE INFLUENZA SEVERITY 27
Olalla, P., Sierra-Moros, M. J., Hanshaoworakul, W., Ungchusak, K., Pe-
body, R., Jain, S., Mounts, A. W. and on behalf of the WHO Work-
ing Group for Risk Factors forSevere H1N1pdm Infection (2011). Risk factors
for severe outcomes following 2009 influenza A(H1N1) infection: A global pooled anal-
ysis. PLoS Med 8 e1001053+.
Welton, N. J. and Ades, A. E. (2005). A model of toxoplasmosis incidence in the UK:
Evidence synthesis and consistency of evidence. J. R. Stat. Soc. Ser. C. Appl. Stat. 54
385–404. MR2135881
Wielders, C. C. H., van Lier, E. A., van’t Klooster, T. M., van Gageldonk-
Lafeber, A. B., van den Wijngaard, C. C., Haagsma, J. A., Donker, G. A.,
Meijer, A., van der Hoek, W., Lugne´r, A. K., Kretzschmar, M. E. E. and
van der Sande, M. A. B. (2012). The burden of 2009 pandemic influenza A(H1N1)
in the Netherlands. The European Journal of Public Health 22 150–157.
Wilson, N. and Baker, M. G. (2009). The emerging influenza pandemic: Estimating
the case fatality ratio. Euro Surveill. 14.
Wong, J. Y., Kelly, H., Ip, D. K., Wu, J. T., Leung, G. M. and Cowling, B. J.
(2013). Case fatality risk of influenza A(H1N1pdm09): A systematic review. Epidemi-
ology (Cambridge, Mass.) 24 830–841.
Wu, J. T.,Ma, E. S. K., Lee, C. K., Chu, D. K. W., Ho, P.-L., Shen, A. L., Ho, A.,
Hung, I. F. N., Riley, S., Ho, L. M., Lin, C. K., Tsang, T., Lo, S.-V., Lau, Y.-L.,
Leung, G. M., Cowling, B. J. and Peiris, J. S. M. (2010). The infection attack
rate and severity of 2009 pandemic H1N1 influenza in Hong Kong. Clinical Infectious
Diseases 51 1184–1191.
Yang, J.-R., Huang, Y.-P., Chang, F.-Y., Hsu, L.-C., Lin, Y.-C., Su, C.-H.,
Chen, P.-J., Wu, H.-S. and Liu, M.-T. (2011). New variants and age shift to high
fatality groups contribute to severe successive waves in the 2009 influenza pandemic in
Taiwan. PLoS ONE 6 e28288+.
A. M. Presanis
P. J. Birrell
B. D. M. Tom
D. De Angelis
Medical Research Council
Biostatistics Unit
Cambridge Institute of Public Health
Forvie Site Robinson Way
Cambridge Biomedical Campus
Cambridge CB2 0SR
United Kingdom
E-mail: anne.presanis@mrc-bsu.cam.ac.uk
R. G. Pebody
H. K. Green
Public Health England
61 Colindale Avenue
London NW9 5EQ
United Kingdom
H. Durnall
D. Fleming
RCGP Research & Surveillance Centre
Lordswood Medical Group
54 Lordswood Road Harborne
Birmingham B17 9DB
United Kingdom
